Twelve Days: Revolution 1956. How the Hungarians tried to topple their Soviet masters by Victor Sebestyen

Twelve Days: Revolution 1956. How the Hungarians tried to topple their Soviet masters by Victor Sebestyen

Author:Victor Sebestyen [Sebestyen, Victor]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History
ISBN: 9780297865438
Publisher: Orion
Published: 2010-11-25T00:00:00+00:00


The Soviet magnates needed a way out of the Hungarian impasse. The uprising was the biggest threat they had yet faced to the empire they had won little more than a decade earlier. The air of crisis in the Kremlin was palpable. True to form, their first instinct was to squabble amongst themselves and blame each other for ‘a capitulation’ in Budapest.

Khrushchev had told Nagy early in the morning, in his cheery, expansive style, full of bonhomie, not to worry. The ceasefire would hold from the Russian side, he insisted, and he issued an order to the military commanders to make sure that it did. Despite the commitment he had given, though, he needed the other Soviet leaders to agree, which was not a foregone conclusion. The serious splits and personal rivalries in Moscow made decision-making a protracted business of elaborate horse-trading. The Soviet potentates finally agreed to the ceasefire in Budapest after a bruising encounter of several hours – starting at noon and interrupted by calls to Mikoyan in Budapest.

The divisions that initially emerged the day Stalin died had deepened and with the stakes so high the discussions grew bitter. The hardliners began the attack. Voroshilov, invariably still dressed in a uniform covered with medals, blamed the two emissaries who had been sent five days earlier to Budapest – but particularly his sworn enemy Mikoyan – for the ‘bad situation’ in Hungary. ‘They are poorly informed. Mikoyan cannot carry out his work … We acted correctly when we sent in the troops. We should be in no hurry to pull them out. We should not withdraw but act decisively.’14 Molotov brooded and was itching to make a move to destabilise Khrushchev at the first available opportunity: ‘Things are falling apart in Hungary,’ he said. ‘Mikoyan and Suslov are providing calm and reassurances while things have deteriorated badly. Nagy is actually speaking against us.’ Kaganovich was simple, direct and predictably unimaginative: ‘Firm action is needed against the centres of resistance. We cannot retreat.’

Then the moderates weighed in. Marshal Zhukov, who was all in favour of sending in troops a few days earlier, was now far more conciliatory. ‘It’s unfair to criticise Mikoyan right now. The situation has unfolded quite differently than we thought when we decided to send in the troops. We must display political flexibility. We should keep the troops on full readiness … but [also] the question of a troop withdrawal from Hungary must be considered. In Budapest we must pull troops off the streets in some areas.’ At this Voroshilov flared up. His criticism became harsher: ‘The American secret services are more active in Hungary than comrades Suslov and Mikoyan are. We sent them there for nothing.’

Khrushchev quietened him down and reminded him that they should focus on what to do next, rather than make recriminations about the past. But he continued to bristle. Nikolai Bulganin, dapper with a goatee beard, saw himself as the ‘moderate’ candidate to take over if Khrushchev fell. He wondered what would happen if they allowed the new Hungarian government to crumble.



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